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Abstract 
 
Although East Asian states possess some common developmental characteristics, the welfare 
capitalism in East Asia has been evolving in the two different directions of institutional 
arrangement. One is social insurance-based scheme and the other is private savings-based scheme. 
This article conceptualizes the first pattern as compensatory (CP) system while the latter as 
competitiveness-enhancing (CE) system. This research examines the divergence of productivist 
welfare capitalism, thus exploring the causal configurations behind this variation. Focusing on the 
pension scheme in South Korea and Singapore, this research shed lights on how different 
financial systems have created the divergence and what role regime types play in facilitating the 
divergence of productivist welfare states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The discussion on how to understand the nature of East Asian welfare regime is still an 
ongoing process. Particularly, the expansion of social protection in South Korea leads scholars to 
raise a question about the usefulness of the concept of ‘productivist regime’ (Kwon & Holliday, 
2007; Wilding, 2008). Some empirical studies provide robust information concerning the 
existence of productivist welfare regime (Lee & Ku, 2007). However, they have limitations in 
explaining why productivist welfare states have developed different institutional formats of social 
security for the last decades and whether this divergence indicates a paradigm shift of welfare 
regime. 
Indeed, East Asian states show a divergence in their way of welfare provision (Kwon, 2005). 
Although East Asian states possess some common developmental characteristics, the welfare 
capitalism in East Asia has been evolving in the two different directions of institutional 
arrangement. One is social insurance-based scheme and the other is private savings-based scheme. 
How can we explain this variation? What is behind the divergence? Before answering this 
question, however, we have to conceptualize the divergence in a theoretical framework and 
decide at what level it takes place. 
Holliday (2000), who presented the concept of productivist welfare regime, also categorizes 
the productivist world into three clusters: facilitative, developmental-universalist, and 
developmental-particularist. 1  However, his categorization is a narrative description of 
characteristics rather than a theoretical framework on which conceptualization and empirical tests 
can be carried out. To develop the concept of productivist welfare more effectively in 
comparative perspectives, it is indispensible to create a theoretical ground that enables us to go 
beyond descriptive single case studies. 
 In this sense, this article explores a theoretical model to test the validity of producitivist 
thesis. The first section examines the nature of divergence. For this goal, two different forms of 
productivist welfare states are presented: One is what I call compensatory system and the other is 
what I call competitiveness-enhancing system. The typology is produced based on two 
dimensions: institutional arrangement and government expenditure. This section also focuses on 
contrasting aspects between South Korea’s pension insurance scheme and Singapore’s provident 
                                                 
1
 In another study, Holliday argues that gradual socio-demographic changes like the increase in life 
expectancy and the decline in female labor-force are expected to have the greatest impact on the 
development of ‘univeralist productivism’ (e.g. Korea) (Kwon & Holliday, 2007). But, the socio-
demographic changes are not unique only in the universalist world of productivist welfare capitalism. 
Therefore, his explanation does not seem to be persuasive.  
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fund scheme to demonstrate the usefulness of the typology. The next section examines the causal 
conditions under which the divergence of productivist welfare states emerges and grows. The 
main argument is that financial system is especially important in the early stage of institutional 
divergence while political regime and electoral competition play an important role in the growth 
of the divergence. The concluding section summarizes all the discussion and provides some 
suggestions for further research. 
 
 
DIVERGENCE OF PRODUCTIVIST WELFARE CAPITALISM 
 
Background: Continuities and Changes 
 
As seen in Table 1, the overall level of social expenditures in East Asia is much lower than 
that of their Western counterparts. The sector-based statistics in the table also reveals another 
sharp contrast between these two worlds. To be sure, East Asian countries spent much more on 
education while significantly less on social security. This productivist pattern of social spending 
has largely continued in the 2000s (See Figure 1).2 Both South Korea and Singapore are one of 
the typical cases of this model.3 But it is also true that a gradual but robust divergence has been 
emerging between these two countries particularly since the mid-1990s. The Korean government 
has strengthened a series of social policy in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis while the 
Singaporean government has still maintained its minimalist social policy. 
 
 
[Table 1] Public Expenditures on Social Welfare, 1995 (% GDP) 
 
[Figure 2] Public Expenditures on Social Welfare, 2000 (% GDP) 
 
 
Indeed, it is noticeable that the Korean government has made vigorous efforts to consolidate 
the foundation of welfare programs, especially of social insurance programs. First, the National 
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 They have also followed a remarkably similar pattern in the order of program development from 
occupational injury protection, health, and old age security provision to unemployment benefits and family 
allowances (Schmidt, 2005).  
3
 For the concept of productivist welfare states, see Holliday (2000), Kwon (1998; 2005), and Lee & Ku 
(2007). 
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Pension Scheme implemented in 1988 was extended to the rural (1995) and urban (1999) self-
employed. Second, the unemployment insurance program was introduced in 1995 and expanded 
to all firms in 1998. Third, hundreds of social health insurance programs, which had been based 
on workplaces for employees and regions for the self-employed, were also unified in an 
integrated national health insurance program in 2000. Moreover, a new social assistance system, 
the National Basic Livelihood Security, was enacted so that needy people who had been excluded 
from the old program became entitled to public assistance.4 In consequence, the share of total 
government spending on social security has increased remarkably from less than 10% to about 
15% (Figure 2). In Singapore, by contrast, the earlier social security structure has continued to 
exist. The Singaporean government still shows strong support for education and vocational 
training, coupled with minimal endowment set by the government (i.e. Medifund), strong 
resistance to unemployment benefits of any sort, and a tightly conditioned system of social 
assistance (Haggard, 2008). Figure 3 illustrates how the continuing presence of productivist 
welfare capitalism prevailed throughout the 1990s and 2000s in Singapore. 
 
 
[Figure 2] Government Expenditure on Social Policy, South Korea (1988-2005) 
 
  [Figure 3] Government Expenditure on Social Policy, Singapore (1986-2005) 
 
 
Certainly, the recent development of social policy in South Korea seems to be a huge leap 
away from the typical model of productivist welfare states, especially when comparing with 
Singapore. Some argue that Korea has already crossed the bottom line of productivism toward a 
social democratic type of welfare state (Kwon, 2002; Ramesh, 2003) while some others view the 
expansion as a strategic response to enhance labor market flexibility in the face of globalization 
(Holliday, 2005). For sure, in the existing productivist framework, it is not easy to explain what 
has been happening in Korea. However, it is also problematic to see the current diverging pattern 
as a paradigm shift because South Korea’s comprehensive expansion of social security programs 
was still predicated on the productivist approach under the name of ‘productive welfare.’ The key 
principle of productive welfare, which was designed by the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-
97) and followed by the Kim Dae-Jung government (1998-2002), was ‘state support for a national 
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 As of 2005, 3% of the total population received benefits from the program (Korea Statistical Information 
Service, http://www.kosis.kr). 
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minimum income floor through job opportunities and training for the poor and disabled’ (Song & 
Hong, 2005). This principle was equivalent to ‘workfare’ aiming at creating work incentives for 
the long-term growth of the economy. 
 Given the continuities and changes in social policy, how can we understand the recent 
divergence taking place within productivist welfare states in general and between South Korea 
and Singapore in particular? As Wilding (2008) raises a question, is it still useful to analyze East 
Asian social policy under the productivist welfare framework? It is important and necessary to 
answer. But this puzzle cannot be solved as long as we hold the assumption that productivist 
welfare states are identical at all different levels of social welfare. 
 
Divergence at the System Level 
 
As Ku & Finer (2007) point out, social welfare can be analyzed at three different levels – 
welfare policy, welfare system, and welfare regime (See Figure 4). It is necessary to make clear 
what level among these three is associated with the divergence of productivist welfare states that 
we have observed. The term policy is used to signify the processes of governmental decision-
making in a single welfare domain. The concept of regime implies a complex of legal and 
organization features that are systematically interwoven by a consistent and deep-rooted principle. 
Particularly, welfare regime highlights a historical legacy deeply embedded in relations between 
the state and economy with regard to production, distribution, and redistribution (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). So the regime type is not easily changed even in the face of internal and 
external challenges (Ku & Finer, 2007). In between, there is welfare system that signifies an 
‘institutional format’ in which every single welfare policies are systematically implemented to 
embody the underlying principle of welfare regime. Noteworthy here is that welfare system as a 
coherent institutional arrangement can appear in some different types depending on its political 
and economic conditions. In other words, system is the level where the divergence of productivist 
welfare regime takes place depending on socioeconomic circumstances. In this research, the 
divergence between South Korea and Singapore is understood not as a paradigm shift of 
productivist welfare regime but as a variation generated at the system level. Then, what is the 
point of systemic divergence of the productivist world of welfare capitalism? 
 
  [Figure 4] Levels of Social Welfare (Productivist) 
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The Point of Divergence 
 
In measuring the variation of welfare states, most scholars use the amount of government 
expenditure on social security. Because data on public expenditure is easily available and also 
enables to present a clear comparison between states, it has been widely used. But there are some 
methodological problems. The public expenditure approach is explicitly based on the assumption 
that the financial source of social policy is the government account only (Kwon, 1998). In fact, 
governments can also materialize their commitment to welfare by intervening in the social 
security provision through other than public expenditures (Castles, 1994). This is especially true 
in the case of East Asian states where welfare delivery is regarded as part of national strategy for 
economic development. For example, despite their initial pattern of public expenditure (i.e. more 
on education but less on social security), South Korea and Singapore have adopted and developed 
a fundamentally different institutional platform of social security.5 Hence, I suggest that welfare 
states be understood in terms of not only the amount of expenditures but also institutional 
arrangement of social security. Between these two points of divergence, institutional arrangement 
is more important because it helps us see the division of responsibility between the state, the 
market, and the household. In the next section, I present an analytical framework to distinguish 
two different systems of productivist welfare regime. 
 
Two Welfare Systems: Compensatory (CP) vs. Competitiveness-enhancing (CE) 
 
Although East Asian countries share some similar characteristics as the productivist model 
of welfare state, they – particularly, middle income countries – can be categorized into two types 
of welfare system alongside (i) institutional arrangement and (ii) government’s financial 
commitment. First, the institutional dimension is related to how governments handle social 
contingencies and who to bear the costs. Most of these institutional aspects can be examined by 
looking at which system between social insurance scheme and private savings scheme those 
states adopt. 6  The social insurance-based scheme aims at pooling social risks and financial 
                                                 
5
 Singapore advocates a private savings-based social security system emphasizing individuals’ 
responsibility while South Korea develops a public insurance-based system focusing on risk pooling. 
Detailed explanation about the differences will be presented in following sections. 
6
 Technically, there are four different sources of financing: (a) government’s general revenues, (b) 
mandatory contributions to social insurance, (c) mandatory contributions to private savings account, and (d) 
voluntary contributions by employer and/or employee (Ramesh & Asher, 2000,). In many social 
democratic welfare states, the major four areas of social security have been financed entirely or primarily 
by the government (a). Voluntary contributions (d) are also observed in liberal welfare states. However, 
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responsibilities among participants while the private savings-based scheme leaves those risks and 
financial burdens upon separate individuals. This contrast shows a series of political and 
socioeconomic implications such as the possibility of income redistribution and the level of 
taxation. 
 The second dimension is the amount of government’s financial commitment to social 
security, which is widely used in comparative social policy studies. Productivist welfare states are 
of course not maximalist (Croissant, 2004). But it does not necessarily mean that they are 
minimalist (Holliday, 2005). Although they do not have a strong commitment to citizens’ social 
rights, some of the productivist welfare states take a broader financial responsibility for social 
protection when the economic benefits are expected to outweigh the cost. Korea and Taiwan have 
clearly started to expand social expenditures and programs, expecting that the expansion would 
have positive effects on the long-term growth of the economy (Kwon & Holliday, 2007).  
Based upon these two dimensions, we can think of two combinations: one is a social 
insurance scheme associated with relatively higher public expenditures, and the other is a private 
savings scheme underlying minimal government involvement. First, social insurance-based 
security scheme is predicate on the principle of defined benefit (DB). In the DB system, one is 
entitled to a certain level of benefits which is – in the case of pension, for example – usually a 
fixed portion of the final salary. While all participants contribute at the same rate, they receive 
different amounts of benefits depending on their earnings. Thus, an income redistribution effect is 
included in the social insurance system (Hindriks & de Donder, 2003). But, it may also cause an 
insurance fund deficit in the long term, which the government has to solve by either spending 
more or implementing a fundamental reform. 
By contrast, the private savings-based social security is based on the principle of defined 
contribution (DC) that one should only receive what one has saved during the working life. In this 
system, all the financial responsibilities belong to each individual and their employer. Therefore, 
there is no deficit problem. At the same time, however, the mechanism has no way to ensure 
adequate benefits for those who are really in needs. Particularly, those with no or low income 
during working life will find themselves with insufficient funds for social security (Ramesh & 
Asher, 2000). Theoretically, this type of institutional arrangement would be a good policy choice 
for those states that strongly pursue a minimalist fiscal policy to maintain their tax rates as low as 
possible. 
                                                                                                                                                 
since the concern of this research is productivist welfare states where state intervention plays a critical role 
through either social insurance or private-savings schemes, I simplify my argument by using only (b) and 
(c) as the sources of social security financing. 
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 The next question is then how we can conceptualize this distinction in the form of a typology. 
Between those two combinations above, the first set – social insurance scheme associated with 
larger expenditures – can be called compensatory (hereafter CP) productivist welfare system. The 
other set – private savings scheme focusing on minimal expenditure – can be depicted as 
competitiveness-enhancing (hereafter CE) productivist welfare system (See Figure 5). With 
respect to social policy, both systems see the role of government as a regulator, and their 
programs are also operated by quasi-government agencies. It is because, through this method, 
governments can avoid or minimize their financial responsibilities for social security while being 
able to effectively intervene in the operation at arm’s length (Kwon, 2005). In this approach, 
social policy plays a role to create a socioeconomic environment that is conducive to economic 
development. But their similarities end there. How to read and handle social risks in the 
developmental context is the place where the key divergence takes place. 
 
 
  [Figure 5] Divergence in the Productivist World of Welfare Capitalism 
 
 
In setting up developmental strategy, some countries may find their economic 
competitiveness in the domestic conditions particularly among skilled workers who are regarded 
as important for economic goals. In this case, a social insurance system is more likely to be 
developed since it is not only crucial to effectively mitigate any possible social contingencies by 
means of risk pooling but also central to the capital accumulation process. Moreover, the social 
insurance scheme helps build up greater integrity and solidarity among those selected group of 
labor forces (Kwon, 2005). Thus, this scheme can be used as a compensatory policy tool in return 
for economic and political supports from its beneficiaries.  
The compensatory approach is not limited to an industrialization period, however. When 
states with the CP productivist welfare system are under pressure of neoliberal economic reform, 
they can still use social insurance programs as a compensation instrument (Yang, 2004). But, the 
target of compensation expands in this case, including not only industrial sectors but also 
‘economic victims’ derived from socioeconomic changes. The expansion of compensation also 
inevitably leads the government to spend more. This argument is well exemplified by the 
experience that South Korea had after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
In 1997, Korea faced a series of social and economic problems such as declining income and 
rising unemployment in the wake of the financial crisis and subsequent reform programs like 
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deregulation, privatization, liberalization of financial market, and labor market flexibility. In the 
end, the Korean government decided to expand the coverage of its existing social insurance 
programs since the expansion of the programs and additional public expenditures would far 
outweigh the possible economic and administrative costs which the governments may otherwise 
need to pay for long-term growth (Yang, 2000; Gillion, 2000). Thus, although the target group of 
compensation would be changed dependent on economic and political conditions, productivist 
welfare states with social insurance schemes tend to enhance its social policies based on the 
principle of CP welfare. 
Productivist welfare states, however, do not always adopt the compensatory approach. Some 
of them seek their economic competitiveness outside in the global market, believing that 
government spending reduces the competitiveness of national producers. Those states with the 
CE welfare system hold a deep-seated principle that welfare programs like income transfer and 
social services distort labor markets and investment decisions (Garret & Nickerson, 2005). Since 
government spending ultimately requires higher taxes on income and wealth which are the 
bottom lines of asset holders, the increase of economic competitiveness depends on low rates of 
taxation and public spending (Wilding, 2008). But it does not imply that the CE system-based 
states entirely ignore the need of social security. Seeing the creation of an optimal environment 
for economic competitiveness as their primary task, productivist welfare states with the CE 
system pursue both the maintenance of low tax rates and the construction of social security net by 
adopting a coercive private savings scheme that all the expected financial responsibilities go to 
each individual. Moreover, the private savings scheme is contributing to the promotion of 
national savings so that the government is able to channel the funds into investment in 
developmental projects without inflationary consequences (Ramesh, 2005). Needless to say, it is 
obvious that the CE system is reinforced when goods and services markets become more 
globalized as a result of either technological innovations in transportation and communication or 
the increase of capital mobility. Therefore, the CE system is expected to emerge more 
significantly in the society where shows a high level of integration into global financial and trade 
markets (e.g. Singapore and Hong Kong). Now we turn to reviewing the pension scheme of South 
Korea and Singapore based upon the CP-CE typology.  
 
National Pension Scheme (NPS) in South Korea 
 
South Korea’s public pension scheme, first designed in 1972 but implemented later in 1988, 
is a social insurance system in which the pension benefits are financed from contributions paid by 
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employees and their employer. 7  As part of the country’s economic policy, the Korean 
Development Institute (KDI) first proposed the National Pension Scheme (NPS) in 1972. The 
enactment of the scheme was clearly driven by the economic purpose to mobilize national capital 
required for the development of heavy and chemical industries. But, due to the first oil shock and 
the following high inflation, it was postponed and not revived until 1988 when South Korea 
embarked on democratic transition. The Roh Tae-Woo government (1988-1992) passed a new 
pension law that covered all firms with more than 10 employees in 1988 and 5 employees in 1992. 
Under the Kim Young-Sam government (1993-1997), it was further extended to farmers, 
fishermen, and the rural self-employed as compensation for the government’s commitment to 
open the rice market in exchange for better access to global markets. As a result, the coverage 
rate increased considerably from 4.2 million workers in the late 1980s to 8.6 million in the mid-
1990s (Yang, 2004). 
 
 
 [Table 2] Low Contribution-High Benefit Structure of NPS (1998) 
 
 
 However, the NPS included a structural problem around the benefit levels and contribution 
rates. Initially, the contribution rate was scheduled to start at 3% while the income replacement 
level was as high as 70%. This unrealistic trend continued until 1997 (See Table 2). The low 
contribution and high benefit structure brought about the financial unsustainability problem, 
igniting debates on the need of pension reform. To solve the problem, a pension reform 
commission was formed and came into operation. However, there was a conflict between 
economic and social policy bureaucrats as to how to reform the system.8 Although both camps 
agreed with the pension expansion to the urban areas, the former proposed a bipillar system 
aiming at financial sustainability as the foremost goals while the latter insisted on the existing 
redistributive monopillar system. In the end, the Kim Young-Sam government chose the bi-pillar 
system that emphasizes an earning-related component. However, the unprecedented financial 
crisis and the power shift from the conservative party to the center-left opposition party in late 
1997 brought about huge changes in the political landscape surrounding social policy processes. 
President Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2002), who found his power base among middle and working 
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 The development of pension scheme in South Korea came with pension plans for civil servants (1962) 
and two other special pension insurances for military personnel (1963) and teachers at private schools 
(1975). 
8
 Refer to Yang (2000) for the details concerning the process of pension reform in South Korea. 
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classes, discarded the previous reform proposal and firmly carried out the monopillar-based 
pension reform. The Kim government built a strong partnership with civic organizations and trade 
unions, letting them participate in public policy processes. However, in spite of its labor-friendly 
ideology, the Kim Dae-Jung government also undertook various neoliberal policies in economic 
terrains. 
As seen in the development process of the NPS, South Korea has consistently utilized social 
policy as an economic and political instrument for economic growth under the productivist 
welfare framework. Even if the target group of beneficiaries has expanded over time in 
accordance with changes in economic and political environment, there was no significant shift in 
terms of its compensatory strategy. In the beginning, the introduction of the pension scheme had a 
dual purpose. It was designed, first, as a method of capital accumulation and, second, as a means 
of risk pooling for a selective group of labor who were supposed to be regime supporters. Later, 
in the middle of democratic transition and economic globalization, the Korean government has 
attempted to strengthen its compensatory strategies by expanding the pension coverage, since 
reaping net gains from globalization cannot be achieved without placating domestic political 
backlash. To increase the effectiveness of compensatory strategies, however, it was also required 
to enhance social assistance programs for those who are in need. As a consequence, the 
government expenditure on social security in South Korea increased significantly since the mid-
1990s. 
 
Central Provident Fund (CPF) in Singapore 
 
What is unique in the history of social policy in Singapore is the Central Provident Fund 
(CPF), a private savings-based social security scheme.9 The CPF was already established in 1953 
before Singapore gained its independence in 1965. At the outset, the British introduced this fully 
funded pension program to avoid the colonial government’s financial responsibilities. Once 
established, the CPF has substantially expanded to serve a range of social security needs 
including pension, housing, and health. In 1968, the savings that individuals accumulated in their 
CPF account could be used to purchase public housing units. The Singaporean government also 
set up a new Medisave account under the framework of the CPF in 1984. Because savings for 
pension were not enough to meet the financial need of the old-age population, the government 
created the Minimum Sum Scheme in 1987, in which a certain amount from the members’ 
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 With respect to the CPF, see Low and Aw (1997), Kwon (1998), Tang (2000), Ramesh & Asher (2000), 
and Ramesh (2004). 
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savings should set aside and used only for old-age income maintenance. Soon after, in 1990, the 
government introduced the Medishield Scheme to supplement the Medisave account and, during 
the 1990s, the government allowed individuals to invest part of their savings in capital markets. 
Thus, the CPF was not designed as a comprehensive social security system but rather has arisen 
as a patchwork to deal with exigencies. Then, how can we understand the characteristics of the 
CPF in the framework of the CP and CE welfare systems? 
 The CPF is a compulsory savings scheme, which is the institutional essence of CE 
productivist welfare. Even though both social insurance and private savings are funded by 
monthly contribution from employees and their employers, there is a critical difference. Unlike 
South Korea’s social insurance schemes, there is neither risk pooling nor a mechanism of income 
redistribution in the CPF. In terms of financing and operating, the role of the state is essentially a 
regulator, so members have no room to rely on the government if not their own account. Without 
doubt, this system is effective in cutting off any additional government expenditure, but the 
problem is that it has no mechanism to protect those who have insufficient savings in their CPF 
account. This residual nature of the CPF was derived from a ‘survival distinct’ pervaded among 
the PAP leaders (Tang, 2000). 
When Singapore became independent from the British rule, it was plagued with a lot of 
problems, i.e. ethnic conflicts, widespread unemployment, and lack of infrastructure. To 
overcome all these problems, the political leadership pursued a strategy of export-led 
industrialization by attracting foreign investments through the provision of tax incentives and the 
development of infrastructure. To achieve this goal, the establishment and expansion of private 
savings-based social security was seen desirable and even indispensible because it could not only 
mobilize capital required for infrastructure but also maintain tax rates low enough to attract 
foreign investment. In consequence, the Singapore government embarked on a series of social 
policy: generous publicly funded benefits for civil servants and strong support for education and 
vocational training while resisting direct state involvement in financing of social insurance. The 
close link between benefits and contributions makes the social security system less sensitive to 
demographic changes and, in contrast to Korea, also helps avoid the problems of sustainability 
and the political costs of unrealistic benefit promises (Chia, 2008). Moreover, since the reduction 
of government expenditure permits tax rates to be maintained at low levels, the government can 
pursue economic development without inflationary concerns (Ramesh, 2005). Thus, the CPF is 
embedded in the competitiveness-enhancing principle that any type of government spending on 
welfare and income redistribution reduces the national competitiveness in the global market. 
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WHAT IS BEHIND THE DIVERGENCE? 
 
Existing Theories 
 
In the previous section, I proposed an analytical framework through which to understand the 
divergence of productivist welfare states. However, we still have one more question. Despite 
certain developmental characteristics, why has productivist welfare capitalism in East Asia been 
evolving in the two different directions of the CP and CE systems? There are a series of 
competing theories of social policy that explain the origin and development of state welfare in the 
advanced industrial countries. However, there are few coherent theoretical frameworks and 
empirical tests of welfare development which is uniquely rooted in non-western, especially 
productivist, social contexts (Ku & Finer, 2007). Hence, it is useful and also desirable to test 
contending theories against the productivist context and thereby pave the way for further research 
on the productivist world of welfare capitalism in East Asia. In this section, I will briefly review 
existing theories and then suggest financial structure and regime type as an alternative 
explanation. 
In examining the causal mechanism leading to ‘varieties of welfare capitalism,’ three 
different strands of approach can be discerned. They are industrialization, globalization, and 
power resources. The former two pay attention to a changing economic environment associated 
with industrialization and economic globalization, respectively, while the last emphasizes 
domestic political dynamism that filters the impact of domestic and international economic 
challenges. 
 First, industrialization has long been considered as an important factor in the development of 
welfare states. According to Wilensky (1975), “economic growth and its demographic and 
bureaucratic outcomes are the root cause of the general emergence of the welfare state.” The rise 
of welfare states is associated with changes stemming from industrialization processes that break 
down traditional forms of social provision and family life. These changes include economic 
growth, growth in an aged and urban population, the division of labor, the rise of cyclical 
unemployment, and changing patterns of family and community life (Pierson, 2004). Based on 
the earlier works of Cutright (1965), Aaron (1967), Pryor (1968), and his own empirical work, 
Wilensky concludes that more than 85% of the international variance in social security effort is to 
be explained by the level of industrialization and its accompanying demographical changes. 
 It is obvious that the degree of industrialization is a powerful indicator of the divergence of 
state welfare. However, if we turn to look at variations among similarly developed or developing 
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states, the industrialization approach loses its explanatory power significantly (Pierson, 2004). 
Moreover, it can hardly explicate why institutional divergence between the CP and CE systems 
take place in East Asia where have a similar level of economic development, life expectancy, 
female labor-force participation, and even cultural values. 
Second, economic globalization is also regarded as critical in determining the destiny of 
welfare states. As briefly touched in the previous section, the popular views that describe the 
effect of globalization are divided into two camps. On the one side, economic globalization is 
viewed to constitute a threat to states’ policy autonomy (Mishra, 1995; Clayton & Pontusson, 
1998). The increase of trade competition and capital mobility is conceived to foster the diffusion 
of market-friendly policies such as flexible labor market, corporate and income tax cuts, and 
sweeping deregulation measures (Teeple, 1995). Evidence on the developing countries and 
emerging markets also suggests that, as the exposure to global markets increases, they tend to 
spend less on social security and as a result the overall size of welfare is reduced (Kaufman and 
Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Rudra, 2002; Wibbels, 2006).  
On the other side, by contrast, a range of literature argues that the increased economic 
vulnerability inherent to international economic openness leads governments to provide their 
citizens with rock-solid social security programs because the provision of social security reduces 
social risks produced by a commitment to a liberal international economic order (Cameron, 1978; 
Ruggie, 1982; Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1997a,;1997b; 1998; Rieger & Leibfried, 1998). The 
increase of market liberalization generates new social contingencies and the eventual emergence 
of interest coalition calling for compensation among those who are economically disadvantageous. 
To deal with this situation, states tend to enhance social safety nets while reaping net gains 
generated by economic globalization. 
 These globalization theses are noteworthy because they are visibly overlapped with the 
theoretical logic underlying in my CP and CE typology. However, they are not free from 
limitations with regard to their assumption that the effect of globalization drives all the states 
‘converging’ either to the bottom (retrenchment) or to the top (expansion). Unlike their 
expectations, empirical results confirm the diverging pattern, showing that some open economies 
in East Asia have limited social spending to win in the international market competition while 
some others have been reinforcing public welfare schemes (Campos & Root, 1996; Ramesh, 
2004). It is of course true that globalization plays a critical role in creating an economic 
environment in which states are pressed to enhance either compensatory policies or 
competitiveness-enhancing policies. But, we still need to find the answer: What is the condition 
under which the institutional divergence between the CP and CE systems takes place? 
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 To explore this condition, a group of scholars have focused on the role played by various 
domestic actors like labor unions and left-wing parties (Korpi, 1983; 2006; O’Connor & Olsen, 
1998). The power resources approach examines the origin and level of social security in terms of 
working class movements and their political representatives who force the government to adopt 
pro-labor policies. However, this perspective overemphasizes the role played by labor unions and 
left-wing parties while overlooking the impact of political institutions (Rothstein, 1998), and 
consequently, it appears to be less persuasive in explaining the institutional divergence of 
productivist welfare states where the role of labor unions and interest groups have long been 
insignificant due to the immaturity of social security scheme and civil society.  
 
Financial System: Credit-Based vs. Market-Based 
 
The industrialization, globalization, and power resources approaches provide useful and 
meaningful insights, but none of them provide a convincing explanation of why the institutional 
divergence emerges in spite of their productivist nature (Lee & Ku, 2007) and why the divergence 
grows visibly in the face of socioeconomic challenges derived from demographic changes and 
economic globalization (Ramesh & Asher, 2000). To answer this question, this section sheds light 
on the financial structure and political conditions under which the systematic variation of 
productivist welfare states has taken place. 
 The concept of productivist welfare capitalism is a product of developmental states where 
government authorities have acted to guide markets and modulate the competitive process of 
industrialization in a way that neoclassical economics says public officials cannot get right 
(White, 1988; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Needless to say, the financial system is one of the most 
critical terrains of this developmental strategy (Stiglitz and Uy, 1996). It is also the place through 
which the impact of globalization is transmitted. Indeed, the developmental strategy and its 
corresponding productivist welfare programs are largely dependent on the structure of financial 
market – particularly, the extent and form of their reliance on foreign investment (Ramesh, 1995). 
 According to Zysman (1983), there are two different types of financial market: ‘bank credit-
based’ and ‘capital market-based.’10  First, in the credit-based financial system, banks play a 
leading role in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, overseeing the investment decisions of 
                                                 
10
 In comparative institutional studies, the difference in the relative importance of banks and capital markets 
is a general criterion to draw a distinction between two types of financial system. More recently, similar 
attempts have been made at classifying systems along similar dimensions. Among the typologies used are 
bank-oriented vs. market-oriented financial system (Rybczinski, 1985), debt-based vs. equity-based or 
intermediated vs. securities-based systems (Berglof, 1997), and insider vs. outsider systems (Franks & 
Mayer, 2001). 
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corporate managers, and providing risk management vehicles while, in the market-based financial 
system, capital markets share center stage with banks in terms of getting society’s savings to 
firms, exerting corporate control, and easing risk management (Berglof, 1997). East Asian states 
are not an exception. Since they embarked on an export-oriented strategy of industrialization, 
East Asian states have intervened intensively the operations of the financial markets, either 
directing credit to some industries through banks or creating a more attractive financial market for 
foreign investment. 
 Second, in a capital market-based financial system, the economies highly rely on funds they 
raise directly from individual investors in stock market. In this case, they are greatly constrained 
by those shareholders who generally seek to maximize the short-term profits of business. 
Particularly, in a system where the accumulation of capital in the form of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and portfolio investment is greatly significant, both inside and outside pressures 
bearing down upon states constrain the range of policy choices available to decision-makers. 
Welfare spending is regarded as a fiscal burden that cannot be sustained in the competitive global 
economy and, accordingly, states are more likely to adopt the CE welfare system (i.e. provident 
funds in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia) that helps construct a sound social security 
system and maintain a minimum level of financial responsibility. That is, the higher the ratio of 
market capitalization and foreign investment, the more likely to adopt private savings-based 
social security system.  
 By contrast, the economies with a credit-based financial system are not as much vulnerable 
to the interests of shareholders as their market-based counterparts. Because bank loans, most of 
the capital provided by banks, are relatively ‘patient’ and ‘less liquid,’ investments can be long-
term oriented. That is, the financial intermediaries – banks – enable both the government and 
companies to establish long-term development strategies without being overly concerned with 
short-run fluctuations in the capital market. The main concern is rather to uphold cooperative 
links between industries and banks so that the government can maintain its full-employment 
strategy in the industrial sector (Huber & Stephens, 2001). In this situation, the states with a bank 
credit-based financial system are likely to advocate social insurance schemes since a long-term 
economic growth strategy basically requires solid social safety nets as a compensatory bumper to 
protect skilled labors from possible social risks (Estevez-Ave, 2001). 
 
 Singapore  
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Between the two financial systems, there is no doubt that Singapore belongs to the group of 
market-based economies. In the last four decades, the Singaporean economy has experienced 
remarkable growth. The GDP in the mid-2000s was more than 10 times that in the mid-1970s. 
This strong economic performance has been attributed to several factors. Among others, the 
exceptionally high level of domestic savings and foreign capital inflows stands out. Domestic 
savings accumulated through the CPF were used to finance large infrastructure projects while 
large foreign companies invested directly by bringing in capital and equipment (Kwong, 2001). 
Indeed, Singapore heavily relied on foreign investment from the very beginning. At the time of 
independence, the Singaporean economy was largely agricultural, and the unemployment rate 
was high. Industrialization was thought to be the only way to absorb the surplus labor and put in 
place a foundation for economic growth. Moreover, since the 1980s, there has been a new reason 
for bringing in foreign investment. As earlier industrialization pushed up wages, the economy 
needed to shift toward higher value-added activities to justify the higher wages. As seen in Table 
3, FDI was one of the few routes for the transfer of advanced technology and funds during the 
1990s. Throughout the 1990s, the ratio of net investment commitment made by foreign 
companies was very high, ranging from about 70 percent up to even 90 percent. 
 
 
[Table 3] The Ratio of Net Investment Commitments in Manufacturing by Foreign Capital 
 
 
Unlike South Korea where had a large domestic market and the financial power of large 
vertically integrated conglomerates, Singapore had to make efforts continuously to update and 
upgrade itself into a regional financial center and encourage foreign companies to set up 
headquarters in Singapore. Due to its structural limitations, Singapore had to also develop its 
social security system in the way to offer the most efficient offshore market in East Asia. The 
efforts the Singapore government has made are also found in its aim of corporate tax policy. In 
Singapore, corporate tax rate, which had been 32 percent in the 1980s, lowered from 22 percent 
to a flat rate of 20 percent in 2004 and is reduced again to 18 percent in 2008 
(http://www.mof.gov.sg). Thus, the Singapore government has been offering tax incentives, 
aiming at making Singapore more globally competitive and attractive for foreign investment. For 
this purpose, it was required to downsize the overall level of government expenditure, 
transferring the financial responsibility of social security on private sector while closely 
orchestrating the provision and management. The construction and expansion of the CE welfare 
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system, which is based on a private savings scheme, is located in the center of this policy 
principle. 
 It is obvious that the CPF include a critical problem in its function of social protection. Some 
studies show that, because the CPF scheme with its pre-retirement withdrawal features have 
serious limitations in addressing income maintenance, health care issues and poverty at old age, 
its effectiveness has been insignificant or at best partially successful in providing social 
protection (Ramesh, 2005; Chia, 2008). Due to the lack of income redistribution element in the 
CPF, the government needed to seek a way to increase return rates of CPF funds. Otherwise, the 
high contribution and high withdrawal structure would lead the average replacement rate as low 
as about 30 percent (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). In the 1990s, as a result, the government had to 
gradually expand financial-investment options, allowing individuals to investment their savings 
in stock markets. In spite of this structural problem and limitation of the CPF, Singapore’s social 
security system has been continuously developing around the enhancement of CE productivist 
welfare, because it was an historical product derived from Singapore’s position in the global 
financial market. 
 
 South Korea 
 
In contrast to Singapore whose heavy reliance on foreign investment is distinctive, the 
industrialization drive led by large domestic conglomerates under the protection of the 
government has created a different type of productivist welfare in South Korea. With its start as a 
resource poor and agrarian economy, South Korea could achieve rapid growth from the mid-
1960s by switching to export-oriented industrialization, as did Singapore. Until the early 1970s, 
products manufactured by labor-intensive light industries accounted for about 70 percent of total 
exports. However, in 1973, the South Korean government sought to shift the emphasis away from 
light industries to heavy and chemical industries. Under the new developmental circumstance, 
large-scale businesses became the target group for which the government supported purposively 
and intensively by providing a significant portion of resources. This strategy was orchestrated by 
the economic bureaucrats through strong state intervention, particularly in the way of financing. 
 One of the most noteworthy features of heavy and chemical industry is how to mobilize 
capital since steel, ships, and automobile required a huge amount of capital. Like the Singaporean 
case, domestic savings and foreign capital played a crucial role for the overhead capital 
investment. However, the majority of foreign capital was channeled in the form of public and 
commercial loans. The government distributed foreign loan capital to the industry via banks at 
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preferential rates under its direction. In contrast, because FDI by foreign companies was tightly 
controlled, it constituted only less than 10 percent of total foreign capital investment until the end 
of the 1970s (Kim, 1989). The share of FDI has increased steadily in the 1980s, and the sectoral 
distribution of foreign loan capital has also changed. Such changes were in part responses to state 
policy changes regarding foreign capital. However, throughout the 1980s, Korea was still one of 
the most indebted economies. The government exercised a monopoly power over financial 
institutions, using banks as a means of allocating monetary resources directly to manufacturing 
industries (Hwang, 2007). In the 1990s, the Kim Young-Sam government pursued the so-called 
‘globalization’ strategy, expanding tax and other incentives for foreign investment in strategic 
high-tech sectors. However, the outcome was not very successful because new FDI in 
manufacturing has declined while most foreign investment went to service sectors (Chau, 2001).  
 
 
[Table 4] Market Capitalization and Welfare System in East Asia 
 
 
The process of financial liberalization was accelerated as the liberal ideology swept through 
East Asia in the mid-1990s, but as can be seen in Table 4, South Korea still had a bank-based 
financial system. The financial structure index (FSI) in Table 4 shows the level of market 
capitalization, which illustrates the relative importance of banks and capital markets in countries 
(Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2001). In terms of size, activity, and efficiency of the financial 
system,11 the index shows that Singapore has continuously developed the market-based financial 
system in the 1990s while, in South Korea, the role played by banks has been still dominating.12 
Coincidently, all the sample states with a higher level of market capitalization have a private 
savings-based social security system. By contrast, those states with a bank credit-based financial 
system have developed social insurance schemes as their social policy.  
 As can be seen all this empirical evidence, bank credit-based and capital market-based 
financial systems have created distinctive economic environment, bringing different views to 
South Korea and Singapore with respect to what type of welfare system they should adopt for 
economic development. That is, the difference in financial system has given different incentives 
                                                 
11
 The index is an average of three indicators: the ratio of market capitalization to bank assets (size), the 
ratio of total value of equities traded to bank credit (activity), and total value of equities traded/GDP 
multiplied by overhead cost (efficiency) (Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2001). 
12
 Once the cyclical component is removed from the indicators used for the FSI, it is more significant that 
Singapore has a high level of market capitalization while South Korea has a bank-based system (Park, Song, 
and Wang, 2005). 
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in designing and implementing either CP or CE welfare systems. However, the conditions for the 
emergence of institutional divergence are not necessarily same with the conditions for the growth 
of the divergence. The next section deals with this issue.  
 
Political Factors: Regime Type, Electoral Competition, and Public Attitude 
 
 Supply Side 
 
The type of financial system is not automatically linked to the growth of the divergence. It is 
misleading to say as if the divergence between the CP and CE welfare systems emerges wholly 
determined and fully formed from a set of pre-existing economic prerequisites. A distinction 
needs to be drawn between the economic condition for the creation of the CP and CE systems and 
the political condition for the growth of the systematic divergence (Pierson, 2004). In the 
productivist world, the divergence of welfare system emerges as a policy choice resulting from 
the initial needs of the state and market. But the eventual growth largely depends on political 
processes (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008).  
 As Adsera and Boix (2001) point out, compensatory strategies are likely to be held as a 
result of democratic political processes whereas competitiveness-enhancing initiatives are more 
likely to dominate policy choices and instruments in authoritarian regimes. Following this 
argument, political factors can be considered at three different, but interrelated, dimensions: 
regime type, electoral competition, and citizens’ political attitude. 
 Democracy is clearly not a necessary condition for the creation of welfare states, but 
democratic governments have greater incentives to respond to social pressures for social security 
and services than authoritarian regimes (Haggard, 2005). This claim is predicated on the 
assumption that political competition makes political parties and leaders be sensitive to 
constituents’ policy demand so that democratic states are more likely to approve social policies 
that might impose financial burdens on the government (Pierson, 2001; Garrett & Nickerson, 
2005). This is especially evident when the political parties are under pressure from electoral 
competition (Ramesh, 1995). Such competition on the supply side provides incentives for 
politicians to appeal to voters by means of an expansion of compensatory welfare programs. But 
it is also important to see, on the demand side, what political attitude and belief citizens have 
toward the political tug of war over social policy decisions.  
 The shift in the economic growth strategy from light industries to heavy and chemical 
industries required the Korean government to mobilize a substantial amount of domestic capital. 
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The National Pension Scheme was formulated by the KDI in this context in 1972. However, in 
addition to the need of capital accumulation, there was another political motivation behind the 
decision (Hwang, 2007). The presidential election held in 1971 was highly competitive enough to 
be a threat to the Park Chung-Hee regime. Also, to win the upcoming general election, the Park 
government had to find a way to justify its authoritarian rule. The introduction of the NPS was 
expected to fit best for these goals. Although the implement was postponed due to the first oil 
shock, the NPS emerged again as a political instrument to gain votes in the presidential election 
of 1987. After more than two decades of struggle against authoritarian rule, South Korea achieved 
electoral democracy in 1987 when, Roh Tae-Woo, the ruling party’s presidential candidate, 
promised to build up a system of direct, fair presidential elections. Since then, the expansion of 
social insurance programs including the NPS became one of popular electoral pledges. 
As seen in Figure, the rates of popular votes between presidential election candidates were 
quite close. The margin has been about 6 to 8 percent, just except the 2007 election. This intensity 
of electoral competition among parties has brought a strong pressure to the governments in Korea 
to be responsive to the demand for social welfare. Thus, democratic transition and electoral 
competition played a critical role in the expansion of social security programs in South Korea. 
 
 
[Figure 6] Electoral Competition in South Korea 
 
 
Although the initial design and implementation of the NPS was carried out under the 
conservative governments of Roh Tae-Woo (1988-92) and Kim Young-Sam (1993-97) in the 
middle of electoral competition, it was largely unequal in coverage. A substantial expansion of 
the NPS was made under the Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2002) government in the context of the 
financial crisis and following social pressures (Haggard, 2008). 
The traditional form of productivist welfare regime was rested on four main pillars: 
remarkable economic growth, relatively young population, strong role of family in the provision 
of social security, and limited social protest and pressure (Holliday & Wilding, 2003). However, 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis brought South Korea to the brink of insolvency, pushing the 
unemployment rate up to about 7 percent and increasing income inequality and poverty. 
Furthermore, a sharp challenge from the rise of ageing population and the decline of fertility has 
been forcing the government to play a larger role in caring for those who are in need. On the one 
hand, the financial crisis placed fiscal constraints on the Korean government and spurred wide-
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ranging economic reforms, including further liberalization of trade and investment and extensive 
corporate and financial restructuring and, on the other hand, the Korean government came under 
pressure to expand more protection as compensatory for the insecurity caused by neoliberal 
reform measures. In the stalemate between these two demands, democratic governance played a 
critical role in several important ways. Most significant was that Kim Dae-Jung, who was elected 
president in 1997, proactively drew civil organizations and trade unions in policy making 
processes to strengthen a series of compensatory social policies in exchange for business-friendly 
reform measures. Thus, democratic transition and competitive elections have contributed to 
making Korea’s welfare system more compensatory, especially under the influence of economic 
globalization.  
 At the other extreme, by contrast, is Singapore. Even though there are some democratic 
procedures, Singapore is obviously less than democratic (Chua, 2005). To be sure, Singapore has 
open and competitive elections but on unfair ground. Electoral and other rules are a kind of 
political tools for securing the hegemony of the People’s Action Party (PA), the ruling party. The 
governments placed clear limits on the opposition and labor unions. Civil society activities are 
also tightly restrained (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). Figure 7 presents the contrasting feature 
between South Korea and Singapore. According to the index of democratic governance, South 
Korea has remarkably developed its democratic institutions up to the highest level (10) since 
1987, while Singapore has been staying at a low level of democratic governance (-3) without any 
significant changes. 
 
 
[Figure 7] Democratic Transition in East Asia 
 
 
In fact, during the 1950s and 1960s when the power base of the PAP was not that sound, the 
government employed a dual strategy of promoting economic development while providing a 
certain degree of social welfare in order to win elections. When the PAP won elections with 
impressive majorities and solid political support, it has never lost its political dominance. 
However, the PAP also became less enthusiastic towards social security programs (Ramesh & 
Asher, 2000). Since then, the main concern of the Singaporean government has completely 
shifted to the creation of favorable economic and political conditions for inflows of FDI. Labor 
control was also clearly related to this economic development strategy that heavily relied on 
attracting FDI. 
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Demand Side 
 
As observed in the case of Korea and Singapore, the supply side – regime type and electoral 
competition – is an important component in explaining the divergence of productivist welfare 
states. Equally, it is also important to see the demand side of the political market. With regard to 
legitimacy, the PAP has attained enormous supports from the Singaporean people based on its 
economic success. It has continued to receive high levels of electoral mandate in successive 
general elections for the last five decades. Also, the PAP could use its economic performance as a 
justification for further extension of state intervention, transforming citizenship into ‘clients’ of 
the state (Chua, 1994). This is reflected in the pattern of general election results. Table shows that 
the PAP government started from a solid political platform of securing 54 percent of the total 
votes in 1959. This was gradually increased to about 60 or 70 percent in the following decades.  
 
 
[Table] Electoral Dominance of the PAP (votes %) 
 
 
Also, with regard to the contribution rate, the CPF includes an important feature through 
which we can look into the public attitude indirectly. Throughout the history of the CPF, the 
contribution rate has changed several times, fluctuating from as low as 10 percent in 1955 to 20 
percent in 1970, and even up to 50 percent in 1984. After some more adjustments to the rate, it is 
now fixed at 34.5 percent (as of 2007).13 It is of course not unusual to see the up-swing of 
contribution rates and the down-turn of benefit levels, but in the case of Singapore, changes in the 
rate are quite significant. Unlike other countries where contribution rates usually change in the 
wake of power shift, the Singaporean government has continued to exercise discretion over the 
setting of contribution rate under the strong grip on power of the PAP. The Singapore government 
faced few political constraints on raising CPF contribution rates, could shift the balance between 
employer and employee contributions, and could continually revise the uses to which funds could 
be put from housing to education, private investment, and health care (Haggard 2005, 159). This 
indicates the extent to which the Singaporean government enjoys policy autonomy more from 
domestic pressures but less from global market constraints (Ramesh, 1995). 
In sum, democratic governance and electoral competition have considerably increased the 
demand for social security in South Korea, while the ruling party in Singapore could maintain its 
                                                 
13
 In general, lower rates are applied to employees aged 50 and above (http://www.cpf.gov.sg). 
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minimalist social security system with public support for nearly half century. This difference in 
political conditions and the influence of economic globalization have driven the growth of 
systematic divergence between CP and CE productivist welfare systems, while the difference in 
the financial system played a crucial role in prompting the emergence of the divergence.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
How can we understand the emergence and growth of divergence observed in the 
productivist world of welfare capitalism in East Asia? If the divergence is systematic by nature, 
what are the independent variables behind this variation? It is not easy to answer these questions 
unless we develop a theoretical framework through which the divergence can be carefully 
examined. To solve the puzzles, this research presented a theoretical model consisting of 
compensatory (CP) and competitive-enhancing (CE) systems of productivist welfare. The CP 
system is supposed to have social insurance schemes associated with relatively higher public 
expenditures, while the CE system is based on a private savings scheme underlying minimal 
government involvement. Korea’s National Pension Scheme and Singapore’s CPF are the most 
typical cases of these two systems. As examined in this article, the divergence into these two 
systems was not accidental at all. It was a historical product of economic and political conditions. 
First, financial system played a significant role in generating the divergence. The different 
economic conditions derived from bank credit-based and capital market-based financial systems 
brought different policy options to South Korea and Singapore in designing and implementing 
their social security system. Second, compensatory strategies were likely to grow as a result of 
democratic political processes whereas competitiveness-enhancing initiatives were more likely to 
develop in authoritarian regimes. It is because democratic governments have greater incentives to 
respond to social pressures for social security and services than authoritarian regimes. 
The main purpose of this article is to set up a theoretical ground on which the study of social 
policy in East Asia can make progress. However, as Ku & Finer (2007) emphasize, the discussion 
presented in this article should be tested by a series of empirical analyses including cluster 
analysis and cross-national time-series regression analysis to verify its usefulness. By doing so, 
the productivist thesis would be able to be more productive. 
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Table 1: Public Expenditures on Social Welfare, 1995 (% GDP) 
 
East Asian Countries (1995) Western Countries (1993) 
 
China Hong Kong Japand Korea Singaporee Taiwanf France Germany Sweden UK US 
Education 1.96c 3.03   3.60   4.94 2.86   5.01   5.60   4.70h   6.70   5.20   5.20 
Health Care .. 1.96   5.07   0.47 0.84   3.88   7.28   6.43   6.22   5.75   5.85 
Social Security & Welfare a 0.19 1.22   7.37   2.15 0.39   1.83g 20.52 21.58 30.66 15.83   9.83 
Housing b .. .. ..   3.05 0.55   0.38   0.92   0.24   1.17   1.84 .. 
Total 2.15 6.21 16.04 10.61 4.64 11.10 34.32 32.95 44.75 28.62 20.88 
 
* Source: OECD (1996a; 1996b), ADB (2001, 2003, 2007), Jacobs (2000). 
* Notes: a Including social security insurances, social services, and social assistances. 
               
b
 Including community development in case of East Asian countries. c Both education and health  
               care. d 1992. e Central government only. f 1996. g Pensions only. h 1994. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Public Expenditures on Social Welfare, 2000 (% GDP) 
 
 
 
* Source: World Bank (2007), ADB (2007) 
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Figure 2: Government Expenditure on Social Policy, South Korea (1988-2005) 
 
(% of Total Govt Expenditure) 
 
 
* Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (Various Years). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Government Expenditure on Social Policy, Singapore (1986-2005) 
 
(% of Total Govt Expenditure) 
 
 
 
* Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (Various Years). 
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Figure 4: Levels of Social Welfare (Productivist) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Divergence in the Productivist World of Welfare Capitalism 
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Table 2: Low Contribution–High Benefit Structure of NPS (1998) 
 
Country Germany Japan Sweden Korea 
Contribution Rate (%) 
Income Replacement (%) 
Retirement Age 
18.6 
60 
65 
16.5 
69 
60 
20.3 
60 
65 
9 
70 
60 
 
  * Source: Yang (2004: 197)  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The Ratio of Net Investment Commitments in Manufacturing by Foreign 
Capital (%) 
 
Country Origin 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Foreign 89 84 79 81 75 71 71 
Local 11 16 21 19 25 29 29 
 
* Source: Kwong (2001: 12) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Market Capitalization and Welfare System in East Asia 
 
System Countries  Financial Structure Index (FSI) Classification 
Social 
Insurance 
(CP) 
Korea 
Japan 
Thailand 
   0.89 
– 0.19 
   0.39 
Bank-based 
Private 
Savings 
(CE) 
Singapore 
Hong Kong 
Malaysia 
   1.18 
   2.10 
   2.93 
Market-base 
 
* Source: Adapted from Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (2001) 
* Note: In their analysis, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine categorize Korea and Thailand as a market- 
     based system. But the index clearly indicates that these countries have a lower level of  
     market capitalization (less than 1). 
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Figure 6: Electoral Competition in South Korea (votes %) 
 
President Election 
 
 
* Source: National Election Commission, South Korea (http://www.nec.go.kr)  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Democratic Transition in East Asia 
 
 
 
 
* Source: Polity IV Database (Marshall and Jaggers 2007) 
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[Table 5] Electoral Dominance of the PAP (votes %) 
 
General Election 
 
 
 
* Source: Election Department, Singapore (http://www.elections.gov.sg)  
 
 
